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Introduction and summary
The purpose of financial regulation is to improve upon
the performance of financial markets relative to how
they would perform driven solely by the forces of the
private marketplace. For example, in the 1930s it was
decided that, left unchecked, competition in the pric-
ing of U.S. banking services could become so intense
that it would actually be harmful to the functioning of
the markets. This resulted in the introduction of inter-
est rate and price restrictions to provide banks with
an inexpensive source of funds. In addition, to insure
that local market participants were not forced from the
market as a result of excessive competition, entry
barriers and branching restrictions were introduced.
Such regulation, however, frequently results in
unintended behavior and market inefficiencies. The
price restrictions aimed at providing an inexpensive
source of bank funding resulted in disintermediation
and significant bank expenditures to circumvent the
restrictions. The entry barriers resulted in inferior ser-
vice levels and the generation of local market power
by incumbent institutions as competing service pro-
viders were unable to use an efficient entry mecha-
nism. These unintended effects often prompt re-regu-
lation to realize the original intent of the regulation, but
without the resulting inefficiencies. However, re-regu-
lation typically results in additional responses by
bankers aimed at avoiding the effect of the regulation.
In responding to regulation, banks are altering
the production process. The theoretical foundation
for most bank cost studies is based on the maintained
assumption of cost minimization with respect to mar-
ket input prices in competitive markets.1 However,
extensive evidence suggests that this is not the behav-
ior practiced by regulated firms. Regulated firms fre-
quently alter the production process from what it
would be absent the regulation. Banking firms are
subject to extensive regulation in nearly all facets of
operations, raising the possibility that the assump-
tion of cost-minimizing behavior in response to market
input prices may be particularly inappropriate for
this industry.
Our objective is to evaluate whether industry
regulations distort firm behavior and, as a result, gen-
erate productive inefficiency in the mix of inputs used
by banks (for example, physical capital to labor ratios).
We estimate this allocative inefficiency using a gen-
eralized cost function that allows for cost-minimization
behavior, taking into account the above-mentioned
distortions resulting from regulation. From a theoretical
viewpoint, the generalized model is superior to the
standard model. We test to see if there is also a statis-
tical difference. We evaluate the impact of accounting
for the regulatory distortions on various cost charac-
teristics.2 In addition to generating a measure of ineffi-
ciency resulting from banks using a suboptimal mix of
inputs, we obtain a measure of the level of inefficiency
resulting from the underutilization or mismanagement
of inputs, that is, technical inefficiency. Finally, we
analyze the effect of relaxing the regulatory constraints.
For a sample of large U.S. banks, we find statisti-
cally significant input price distortions, and resulting
allocative inefficiency, which we attribute to regulation.
We reject the standard cost model in favor of a more
general one, which allows for cost minimization22 Economic Perspectives
subject to effective input prices that can differ from
market prices as a result of regulation. Findings from
our analysis of the 197287 period suggest that for
our sample of banks, scope economies and minor
scale economies existed. Scope economies exist if the
cost of joint production is less than the cost resulting
from independent production processes; scale econ-
omies exist if, over a given range of output, per unit
costs decline as output increases. In addition, technol-
ogy played a significant role in reducing costs, and
regulatory induced allocative inefficiency existed.
Although statistically significant, the allocative effi-
ciency distortions appear to be relatively minor. The
advantages of the generalized cost model become
apparent, however, when we compare the 197279
period, one of significant regulation, with the 198487
period, which is considered the deregulated environ-
ment. Our findings suggest that the banking environ-
ment changed significantly between these two periods.
Allocative inefficiency was a factor in 197279, but
was nearly nonexistent in the later period. Banks ap-
parently responded to the deregulated environment by
altering their production process to fully exploit scale
economies, and reaped significant returns from tech-
nological change. We conclude that the heavy regula-
tion of the earlier period had a significant adverse effect
on bank efficiency.
Productive efficiency: The basics
Basic economic theory assumes that production
occurs in an environment in which an attempt is made
to maximize profits by operating in the most efficient
manner possible. The competitive model suggests that
firms that fail to do so will be driven from the market
by more efficient ones. These competitive forces gen-
erate an industry of firms producing efficiently with
respect to the scale and scope of operation and the
mix and quantity of inputs used. However, when market
imperfections weaken competitive forces, inefficient
firms may continue to prosper. True firm behavior
may vary from that implied by the competitive model.
Firms may find they are not required to operate as
efficiently as possible because they are protected
from the discipline of the market by either natural or
regulatory forces. Inefficiencies can then arise and
the characteristics associated with the competitive
model (efficient scale, scope, and input utilization)
no longer hold.
Variations from productive efficiency can be bro-
ken down into input- and output-induced inefficien-
cies. Assuming a given level of output, input ineffi-
ciency implies the firm is not optimally using the
factors of production. That is, the given level of
output is not produced at the lowest possible cost.
Output efficiency requires the production of both the
optimal level and the optimal mix of outputs.
Overall input inefficiency resulting from the sub-
optimal use of inputs can be divided into allocative
and pure technical inefficiency. Allocative inefficien-
cy occurs when inputs are combined in suboptimal
proportions. Regulation is typically given as a major
reason for this. An extreme example would be if regu-
lations mandated that regulated firms use a particular
process to produce a commodity. For example, no
machinery can be used. Even if the inputs other than
capital were used as effectively as possible, the
ban on machinery would most likely result in a pro-
duction process that would be less efficient than the
unrestricted process.
Pure technical inefficiency occurs when more of
each input is used than should be required to produce
a given level of output. This type of inefficiency is
more difficult to explain, but it is typically attributed
to weak competitive forces that allow inefficient firms
to remain in the market despite their inferior produc-
tivity. Pure technical inefficiency implies that firms
employ the proper mix of inputs, but mismanage them.
Combining allocative and pure technical inefficiency,
we get the overall inefficiency resulting from the im-
proper use of inputs. The distinction between the two
types of inefficiency is important because they may
be caused by different forces and, therefore, be cor-
rectable by different means. For example, the explicit
repeal of regulations may result in an increase in
allocative efficiency, while a general increase in the
level of competition permitted (perhaps through
reductions in entry barriers) may increase pure tech-
nical efficiency.
Productive efficiency also requires optimizing
behavior with respect to outputs. Here, optimal behav-
ior necessitates production of the level and combina-
tion of outputs that correspond to the production
process with the lowest per unit cost. An optimal out-
put level is possible if economies and diseconomies of
scale exist at different output levels. Economies of
scale exist if, over a given range of output, per unit
costs decline as output increases. Increases in per
unit cost correspond to decreasing returns to scale.
A scale-efficient firm will produce where there are
constant returns to scale; that is, changes in output
result in proportional changes in costs. Many recent
bank mergers have been justified on the basis of po-
tential scale economies realized by the new combined
entity.3 Because it involves the choice of an inefficient
level, scale inefficiency is considered a form of techni-
cal inefficiency. Thus, total technical inefficiency23 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
includes both pure technical and scale inefficiency,
or inefficient levels of both inputs and outputs.
Additional cost advantages may result from pro-
ducing more than one product. For example, a firm
may be able to jointly produce two or more outputs
more cheaply than producing them separately. If the
cost of joint production is less than the cost resulting
from independent production processes, economies
of scope exist. Diseconomies of scope exist if the
joint production costs are actually higher than the
cost of specialized or stand-alone production of the
individual products. In banking, potential scope
economies are typically precluded by regulatory
limitations on bank activities.
Finally, pure technical inefficiency is entirely
under the control of, and results directly from the
behavior of, the producer, whereas output inefficiency
and allocative inefficiency may be unavoidable from
the firms perspective. For example, a firm optimally
using inputs may find that per unit cost declines over
the entire range of market demand. While increasing
production would generate cost savings or efficiencies,
the characteristics of market demand may not justify
it. Failure to exploit scope advantages may also result
from factors outside of the control of the firm. Clearly,
in banking the array of allowable activities is con-
strained by regulation. This may preclude potential
gains from the joint production of various financial
services. Further, as mentioned earlier, allocative inef-
ficiency may occur as a direct result of regulation.
For example, during the 1970s, banks were restricted
with respect to the explicit interest rates they could
pay depositors. As market rates rose above allowable
levels, banks frequently substituted implicit interest
payments in the form of non-price payments or im-
proved service levelsfor example, a free toaster
with the opening of a new savings account, or more
offices per capita or per area.4 This resulted in an
overutilization of physical capital relative to other
inputs. In this case, regulation was the driving force
behind the resulting allocative inefficiency.
Generalized model of bank costs
To generate our cost and efficiency estimates, we
use a methodology developed by Lau and Yotopoulos
(1971) and Atkinson and Halvorsen (1980). This shad-
ow price model has been employed in previous stud-
ies to account for regulatory-induced market distor-
tions, for example, Atkinson and Halvorsen (1984),
and Evanoff, Israilevich, and Merris (1989). In this
model, firms optimize with respect to the shadow
price or effective price of inputs, which includes any
non-price aspects such as regulatory burden.
We apply the more general shadow price (SP) model
with additional variables specific to banking. (See the
studies listed above for a detailed discussion of the
methodology and the technical appendix for a summary
of the formal derivation of the cost relationships.)
From basic microeconomics, the condition required
for optimization behavior in the standard cost model
is for the firm to produce at the level where the ratio
of the marginal products of the inputs employed5
(that is, the ratio of the changes in output associated
with marginal changes in inputs) is equal to the ratio
of the prices of the inputs.
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In equation 1, fi denotes the marginal product
of input i, and Pi is the price of input i. Given that the
firm takes input prices and the level of output as given,
it can then derive the optimal combination of inputs
to minimize costs.6
The standard model typically assumes that the
optimal combination of inputs is determined by prices
observed in the marketplace. Therefore, the observed
and optimal costs are equivalent. However, if additional
constraints exist, such as those imposed by regulation,
the true cost of the input need not equal the observed
price. There may be non-price costs induced by regu-
lations, and these will also be accounted for in the
firms optimization process. As discussed earlier, when
deposit rate ceilings were imposed, banks were limited
in their ability to compete directly for funds. The banks
then used non-price competition in an attempt to
elude the restriction.7 One result of this in the 1970s
was the significant proliferation of bank offices in
states allowing broad branching as banks attempted
to compete with brick and mortar. The decision to
introduce more branch offices was not driven entirely
by the market price of physical capital. More physical
capital was used than would have been suggested by
the market price alone, because the perceived return
on these capital expenditures differed from that implied
by the market prices. In other words, the effective price
of physical capital was less than the market price. In
determining the true effective price of inputs, these ad-
ditional regulatory constraints must be taken into ac-
count. This possibility is captured by the more gener-
alized cost model presented in the technical appendix.
The input combination generating cost minimiza-
tion, therefore, equates the ratio of marginal products
to the ratio of the effective prices of the inputs, includ-
ing the non-price costs. It is these effective or shadow
prices that are influenced by regulation and drive24 Economic Perspectives
behavior. In the technical appendix, we show how
one can derive the banks cost function using shadow
prices rather than observed prices. The resulting shad-
ow cost function is a more comprehensive represen-
tation of costs to be minimized and is the appropriate
representation of the production process. In the absence
of binding regulatory constraints, shadow and actual
prices are equal and the shadow model reduces to the
standard cost model. However, if market and shadow
prices are not equivalent (likely to be the case in a
heavily regulated industry like banking), one needs
to account for the additional regulatory constraints.
The shadow prices of bank inputs are not directly
observable. Therefore, we assume that the shadow
prices are proportional to market prices:
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where Pi is the price for input i, ki is a measure of the
extent of the factor price distortion, and there are m
inputs used in the production process.8 If regulation
is nonbinding, all shadow prices equal the respective
market prices, ki = 1 for all i, and the shadow cost
function reduces to the standard formulation.
In applying the generalized model to large U.S.
banks, we make certain assumptions concerning the
bank production process. We include variables gen-
erally thought to affect costs in the banking industry,
including measures for the number of bank offices,
the holding company structure, and the role of tech-
nological change. We assume that banks produce
four outputs: the dollar value of commercial and indus-
trial loans, installment loans, real estate loans, and
investment securities. Banks produce these outputs
using labor, physical capital, and financial funding.9
More details of the empirical specification are given
in the technical appendix.
We estimated the model for the years 197287
for the largest banks in the U.S. that were members
of a holding company over the entire period. This is
a period during which regulation of the industry was
evolving as certain restrictions became quite binding
and industry participants were arguing for regulatory
relief. The final data set consists of 164 banks and
2,624 observations. Our expectation was that these
institutions were probably in the best position to
avoid adverse effects from regulation, thus making
our findings conservative. Inefficiency could be less
for these institutions than for smaller banks, because
they may have more astute management; be more cost
conscious; and be more involved in wholesale banking,
whereas most regulations concentrate on the retail
side of banking.10
The Bank Call Report was the major data source.
Costs, defined as the sum of expenditures on labor,
funds, and physical capital, the number of banking
offices, and the type of bank holding company orga-
nization (that is, single or multibank) were obtained
from Call Report data. We used a time trend to account
for technical progress. We assigned state level wage
trends for each year to each bank according to the
location of its home office. We approximated the price
of physical capital, PK, from Call Report data as the
ratio of physical capital expenditures, measured as
additions to plant and equipment, furniture, and physi-
cal premises, to the book value of net bank premises,
furniture, and physical equipment. We also calculated
the price of funds from Call Report data as an average
cost of funds. We obtained the input price for labor,
PL, from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Empirical results
We used the standard market price (MP) model
and the more general SP model to estimate costs for
the sample of U.S. banks.11 We find that the standard
model can be statistically rejected in favor of the
more general SP model. Our cost estimates suggest
that observed input prices differ from effective prices.
As expected, we find that the price of physical capital
was distorted downward relative to that of both labor
and financial funding, suggesting that the regulatory-
induced production constraints are binding. In partic-
ular, the cost of capital relative to labor is only 58.8
percent of what it would be in the absence of regula-
tory distortions. We also find that the cost of funds
is biased downward slightly relative to that of labor.12
The cost of funds relative to labor is 97.6 percent of
what it would be absent distortions.
Table 1 shows a number of production character-
istics and additional comparisons between the stan-
dard and generalized models. The calculated scale
elasticity measure suggests the existence of economies
of scale that are significant in a statistical sense. In
particular, according to the first row in table 1, a 1 per-
cent increase in the scale of output increases costs
by only 0.981 percent. The results suggest a U
shaped average cost relationship (the scale elasticity
measure equaling a value of 1.0 at the minimum value
of the average cost relationship), with 58 percent of
the observations falling in the range in which statisti-
cally significant scale economies exist and 35 percent
falling in the range of significant diseconomies. We
also find significant scope economies for the two
broad categories of outputs analyzedloans and
investment securities. Specifically, the second row
of table 1 indicates that when loans and securities are25 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
TABLE 1
Shadow and market price models, statistical results
the cost advantages resulting from tech-
nical progress were approximately 10 per-
cent less than those found with the more
general cost model.15 Thus, in addition to
finding differences in market and effective
input prices that will tend to alter banks
input use decisions, the generalized model
finds differences in other characteristics
of the bank production process.
Bank efficiency
We evaluate the extent of allocative
inefficiency resulting from regulatory
restrictions by deriving the difference
between shadow costs assuming no reg-
ulatory distortions (ki = 1.0) and shadow
costs assuming the estimated factor
price distortions, that is,
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where IA is allocative inefficiency and CS
is the shadow cost relationship. (The
statistic IA is displayed in the final row
of table 1.)
Although our estimates suggest the
perceived price of capital is distorted
downward, we find the resulting ineffi-
ciency from regulatory distortions to be
relatively small. According to the final
row of table 1, the cost of distortions is
less than 1 percent of total costs.16 That
is, on average, allocative distortions re-
sulted in costs being approximately 1 percent higher
than they otherwise would have been. This finding of
limited allocative inefficiency is somewhat similar to
the findings of previous studies, for example, Berger
and Humphrey (1990) and Aly et al. (1990). Only Fer-
rier and Lovell (1990) found significant allocative ef-
fects. Their analysis, however, combines different
types of financial institutions (credit unions, savings
and loans, and commercial banks) and may be influ-
enced by data measurement problems. They also find
labor to be overused relative to capital, which is pre-
cisely the opposite of what we have argued should
occur as a result of regulation.
We also analyze the extent of pure technical inef-
ficiency for the sample of banks, investigating whether
banks overutilize all inputs once the optimal combi-
nation of inputs is determined. We do this by compar-
ing the estimated cost structure to the best practice
cost structure, or the cost frontier. To find the cost
frontier, or the level at which firms would be operating
produced jointly, costs are 28 percent lower than
when they are produced separately. That is, there are
cost benefits from jointly producing the two catego-
ries of output.13
We find the role of technological change to be
significant, suggesting that technical advances over
the period, proxied with a time trend, significantly aid-
ed the production process.14 In particular, the general
model implies that the cost of a given level of output
decreased at a rate of 7.6 percent per year. The tech-
nological advances also resulted in changes in the
production process by altering the mix of inputs used.
Banking firms began economizing on labor relative to
the other inputs (physical capital and financial fund-
ing). Additionally, technical advances tended to flat-
ten the average cost curve, that is, to decrease the
advantages or disadvantages resulting from the scale
of operation. Finally, the more restricted standard cost
model (which ignores regulatory distortions) under-




Shadow price Market price
Cost characteristic model model
Scale elasticity 0.981 .983
(.0033) (.0033)
Scope economies .280 .282
Technical change 0.076 0.069
(.0033) (.0034)
Allocative efficiency 0.01 
Technical notes: The scale elasticity measure is         , where C and
Q denote costs and output, respectively, with values less than 1.0
indicating potential per unit cost savings from increased output. These
scale elasticities are computed by evaluating the model at the mean of
the sample.
The scope economies measure is                     , where C and Ci
denote the cost of joint production of the outputs and the cost of
producing i on a stand-alone basis, respectively. Scope economies show
the extent to which costs are lower (for example, 28 percent) as a result
of jointly producing the outputs. For this measure, two output categories
were consideredloans and investment securities.
The technical change measure,        captures how much cost
changed (for example, 7 percent) per year over the period analyzed as
a result of technical change.
The allocative efficiency measure captures how much costs could be
decreased if the inefficiency were eliminated.
Standard errors of the estimates are presented in parentheses.
A translog function was used to model the cost structure. Therefore,
when generating the scope measure, zero output values were replaced
with small values to avoid arithmetic errors.




if there was no pure technical inefficiency, we use an
approach developed by Berger and Humphrey (1990),
which compares the efficiency levels of high- and
low-cost banking firms. We arrange the data in quar-
tiles according to total cost per dollar of output and
separately estimate SP models for the high- and low-
cost banks. We then compare the costs of the average
bank in the two groups, holding factor prices and
market characteristics constant.17 We find that techni-
cal inefficiency accounts for approximately 21 percent
of costs. That is, elimination of this inefficiency could
decrease costs by 21 percent. This effect is slightly
smaller than that found in previous studies, but the dif-
ference may be due to sample structureas stated earlier,
one would expect the large banks in this sample to oper-
ate more efficiently.
Although we reject the more restrictive model
relative to the more general one, our findings suggest
that the biases induced by the misspecification are
relatively minor for most cost characteristics. The
exception is the measure of technical progress, which
is understated by approximately 10 percent in the
standard model.
Comparison of regulatory periods
Given the relatively low level of allocative ineffi-
ciency, one is tempted to say that regulatory distor-
tions were minor over the period studied. This would
make arguments for industry deregulation less persua-
sive, since the constraints are not shown to distort
behavior appreciably. Additionally, in spite of the
statistical significance of the differences found using
the two models, one may question the net benefits of
the SP specification because biases from the MP model
appear relatively minor. While our results can be in-
terpreted as representing the average distortion over
the 17-year period, regulatory stringency was not
constant over this period. For example, the 1980
Depository Institution Deregulation and Monetary
Control Act and the 1982 Garn-St Germain  Act relaxed
constraints on industry prices, products, and geo-
graphic expansioneach considered a significant
industry restriction, for example, see Evanoff (1985).
Other studies have found that deregulation in the early
1980s did affect firm behavior, for example, LeCompe
and Smith (1990). Below, we account for the changing
regulatory environment and evaluate whether industry
productive behavior varied over the period.
To account for the influence of industry deregu-
lation, we divide the 17 years into the following three
periods: 197279, characterized by significant regula-
tion; 198487, considered the deregulated environment;
and 198083, thought to be a period of adjustment in
response to the newly relaxed restrictions. During the
adjustment period, banks presumably adjusted their
input mix. They may have closed offices previously
opened as a substitute for explicit interest payments
or altered their use of funds relative to the earlier
period. We compare the productive behavior of large
banks during the 197279 (restrictive) and 198487
(less restrictive) regulatory environments by separately
estimating the SP model for the two periods. Table 2
presents a comparison of the resulting cost function
characteristics.18 We find substantial differences for
the two periods. As expected, the price distortions
and resulting inefficiency are significantly greater
for the more restricted 197279 period than for the
later period.19
We find that for the average bank in the sample,
scale economies existed in the early period. According
to the first row of table 2, the scale elasticity measure
is significantly below one. However, the scale econo-
mies were fully exhausted after deregulation. One inter-
pretation of this would be that the banks, faced with
fewer production constraints and increased competi-
tion in the deregulated period, were able to alter their
operations to capture the benefits from scale. That is,
they could more effectively grow their business to
exploit scale advantages, or they could take advantage
of scale economies via mergers and acquisitions.
The findings concerning the role of technology
are particularly interesting. Although technical change
over the entire period was estimated to be approxi-
mately 7 percent (table 1), it appears that most of the
cost savings were realized after deregulation. During
the eight-year regulated period, technology decreased
costs by only 5 percent, while over the significantly
shorter deregulated period, it lowered costs by nearly
26 percent (see the third row of table 2).20 What caused
TABLE 2
Cost characteristics for regulated
and deregulated periods
Cost characteristic 197279 198487
Scale elasticity 0.981 1.01
(0.0045) (0.0067)
Scope economies .885 .891
Technical change 0.050 0.258
(0.0045) (0.056)
Allocative efficiency 0.021 0.001
Observations 1,312 656
Note: See technical notes, table 1.
Source: Evanoff and Israilevich (1990).27 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
the change? There is reason to believe it was a result
of the deregulation.
Deregulation increased the banks ability and
incentives to take advantage of more efficient produc-
tion techniques. We know that the technology was
different in the two periods, because each period has
a unique cost relationship. To evaluate how banks
would have behaved in the later period with the old
regulatory framework and technology (that is, the
technology from the first period) still in place, we
imposed the old technology on the data and recalcu-
lated technological change. We find that technology
would have decreased costs in 198487 by approximately
9 percent, significantly less than the cost savings
actually realized. Inefficiency would also have been
significantly greater than that realized in the later
period. In particular, the fourth row of table 2 shows
that allocative inefficiency was greater than 2 percent
in the earlier period, compared with 0.1 percent in the
later period. It appears, therefore, that banks responded
to deregulation by altering their production techniques
to reap significant benefits from technology that
could not be realized in the regulated environment.
Finally, according to table 2, there was essentially no
difference in economies of scope between the two
periods. This is consistent with the results in table 1,
where our estimates of scope economies were not
affected by regulatory distortions.
Conclusion
We have analyzed costs for a sample of large
banks, which may be more resilient than most banks
to regulation. Nevertheless, we find statistically sig-
nificant input price distortions, which appear to be
due to regulatory constraints. We reject the standard
market price model in favor of a more general one that
allows for cost minimization subject to shadow factor
prices, which can differ from market prices as a result
of regulation. Our analysis incorporates the multi-
product production process and employs the inter-
mediation approach to measuring bank output and
coststhat is, banks serve as an intermediator of finan-
cial services. Findings from our analysis of the 197287
period suggest that for this sample of banks, scope
economies and minor scale economies existed, tech-
nology played a significant role in reducing costs, and
the standard market price model should be rejected
relative to the more general shadow price model.
However, for this time period, the distortions created by
using the market price model appear relatively minor.
The advantages of the shadow price model rela-
tive to the market price model are highlighted in a com-
parison of the pre- and post-deregulated periods
in banking. Our findings suggest that the banking
environment changed significantly. Allocative ineffi-
ciency was a factor in the early time period, but was
nearly nonexistent after deregulation. Banks apparently
responded to the deregulated environment by altering
their production process to fully exploit scale economies,
and reaped significant returns from technological
change. Scope advantages existed in each period.
We have evaluated the effect of regulation on
the production process, particularly efficiency, of
large commercial banks. The effect may be significantly
different for alternative samples. Future studies of
bank costs should consider the role of inefficiencies
induced by regulation and determine whether the pro-
duction process has changed over time. Our analysis
suggests the change has been significant.
The generalized cost model
In the neoclassical cost model, firms are assumed to
minimize costs in the Lagrangian-constrained cost
function given by:
4) [ ( , ) ], LP X f X Z Q =¢- - m
where P and X are (m × 1) vectors of input prices and
quantities, respectively; f (X,Z) is a well-behaved neo-
classical production function; Z is a vector of exoge-
nous variables; Q is a vector of outputs; and m is a
Lagrangian multiplier. From the first-order conditions
for cost minimization, the marginal rate of technical
substitution between inputs i and j is equal to the
ratio of prices of the two inputs. That is,











where fi  º ¶f/¶Xi is the marginal product of input i,
and Pi is the price of input i. Given input prices, and
the predetermined level of output as the only con-
straint, the optimal combination of inputs can be
derived to minimize costs.
Now assume that additional regulatory con-
straints exist. The Lagrangian-constrained cost
function to be minimized becomes:
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where Rh for (h = 1, ..., n) are constraints arising from
regulation, and lh are Lagrangian multipliers. From
the first-order conditions for cost minimization, the
marginal rate of technical substitution between inputs
i and j is equal to the ratio of effective prices of the
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* is the effective or shadow price of input i.
In the absence of binding regulatory constraints,
equation 7 reduces to the neoclassical condition,
whereby the marginal rate of technical substitution
equals the ratio of market prices of inputs:
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This special case is nested within the more general
shadow price relationship (equation 7).
Since the shadow prices of the inputs are not
directly observable, following Lau and Yotopolous
(1971) and Atkinson and Halvorsen (1980, 1984), the
shadow prices are approximated by
91 ) , ..., ,
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where ki is an input-specific factor of proportionality.
As noted by Atkinson and Halvorsen (1980, 1984),
the shadow price approximations can be interpreted
as first-order Taylors series expansions of arbitrary
shadow price functions. When regulation is nonbind-
ing, all shadow prices equal the respective market
prices, ki = 1 for all i, and the shadow cost function
reduces to the more restricted function.
Differing from the restrictive function only in the
input-price variables, the shadow cost function is
given by
10) ( , , ), CC k P Q Z
SS =
where kP is a vector of shadow prices of inputs.
Applying Shephards Lemma, the set of derived




























The shadow factor cost shares are obtained by



















































Using equations 14 and 15, actual factor-cost


























Equations 16 and 17 comprise our model.
For estimation purposes, we specify the shadow
cost function in translog form. Total shadow cost is
specified to be linearly homogeneous in shadow prices.
The level of ki cannot be estimated, given that the
equations for total actual cost and factor cost shares
are homogeneous of degree zero in ki. The shadow
price factor for labor, kL, is set equal to unity and the
shadow price factors for the remaining inputs are
estimated. Therefore, we test for relative price effi-
ciency only, not absolute efficiency.
The total shadow cost function measure in trans-
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and the four outputs;
where gij = gji.
Linear homogeneity in shadow prices implies the
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Using equations 17 and 20, the actual (observed)
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Equation 21 and two of the share equations 22,
appended with classical additive disturbance terms,
constitute the set of equations to be jointly estimated.21
Cost estimates were derived using the iterated seem-
ingly unrelated regression technique.
NOTES
1For a technical discussion, see Diewert (1974).
2We consider the impact on scale and scope economies and
the role of technology.
3There is also significant disagreement on the existence of
these economies; see Evanoff and Israilevich (1990). There
has also been a common misinterpretation in the literature
of precisely what constitutes scale efficiency, see Evanoff
and Israilevich (1995). For an alternative analysis of the
impact of regulation on bank efficiency, see DeYoung (1998)
and accompanying articles. Other recent analyses of bank
efficiency include Berger and Mester (1997) and Berger and
Humphrey (1997).
4See Evanoff (1985) for further discussion of non-price
competition.
5This ratio is the marginal rate of technical substitution
between the inputs.
6That is, the predetermined level of output is the only
constraint imposed on the firm.30 Economic Perspectives
14Using similar data, an aggregate output measure, and pro-
duction expenses only (excluding funding cost), an earlier
study found a more significant influence from technology
(Evanoff, Israilevich, and Merris, 1989). This suggests, as
expected, that technical advances have aided the physical
production process significantly more than the funds gather-
ing process.
15In our empirical analysis, we simultaneously estimate a cost
equation and input share equations. The finding of labor-sav-
ing technology for banks is derived from the input share
equations.
16Again, contrasting these findings to those using an aggre-
gate output measure and production costs suggests, as expected,
that regulatory-induced inefficiencies affect the production
process more than the funds collection process.
17See Berger and Humphrey (1990) for a complete descrip-
tion of the procedure. Our methodology differs slightly be-
cause we do not have to assume that the low-cost quartile
firms are both technically and allocatively efficient. We can
account for allocative inefficiencies by using the SP model.
In theory, we believe this is preferred since even well man-
aged (technically) efficient institutions can be adversely affected
by regulation. However, quantitatively the difference may be
small, given our finding of limited allocative inefficiency.
Also, by using a panel data set, we do not encounter the
problem of limited observations for the subsample of large
banks. Detailed results from the estimates summarized here
are available from the author on request.
18Further details are available from the author.
19Statistical tests indicated the two periods should be viewed
separately.
20We also found that the effect of technology on input shares
was significantly different between the two periods. While
technology was funds-using in both periods, the effect was
much larger in the deregulated period. Similarly, technology
was significantly more capital-saving in the deregulated peri-
od, that is, when firms could compete directly via prices in-
stead of employing alternative (capital-intensive) means to
compete.
21One share equation is dropped because of the singularity of
the variance-covariance matrix of the error terms for the
three-equation system resulting from the adding-up condi-
tions on the share equations. We arbitrarily drop the capital-
share equation. The empirical results are invariant to the
choice of share equation deleted and to the shadow price
chosen for normalization.
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